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xiv | |
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xv | |
| Part I A Theory of Employment Systems |
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The Employment Relationship |
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3 | (28) |
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3 | (5) |
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Incompleteness of the Employment Contract |
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8 | (5) |
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11 | (2) |
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Defining the `Acceptable Set' of Tasks |
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13 | (3) |
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Tacit Knowledge and Problems of Codification |
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13 | (2) |
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Detailed Job Descriptions are not Economic |
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15 | (1) |
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Work Measurement, in Practice, is Negotiation |
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16 | (1) |
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Use of Classification Criteria to Assign Tasks to Jobs |
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16 | (2) |
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The Function of Job Classification Systems |
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18 | (3) |
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Use of Job Categories to Simplify Transactions |
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19 | (2) |
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Articulation into Systems |
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21 | (1) |
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Two Potential Objections to the Argument |
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21 | (2) |
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Insights from the Historical Rise of the Employment Relationship |
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23 | (4) |
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27 | (4) |
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The Limits of Managerial Authority |
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31 | (30) |
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31 | (1) |
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Transaction Rules and the Employment Relation |
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32 | (9) |
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Efficiency: Competencies and Jobs |
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33 | (3) |
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Enforceability: Transparency and the Control of Opportunism |
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36 | (3) |
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The Exhaustiveness of the Classification |
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39 | (2) |
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Examples of Each Type of Task Allocation Rule |
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41 | (5) |
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41 | (1) |
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`Job Territory'/`Tools of the Trade' |
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42 | (2) |
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44 | (1) |
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45 | (1) |
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How each Rule Deals with Different Kinds of Opportunism |
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46 | (11) |
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Job Boundaries and Work Allocation |
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47 | (3) |
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50 | (1) |
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Unusual Tasks and Task Variability |
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51 | (2) |
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The Recognition and Transmission of Skills |
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53 | (4) |
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57 | (4) |
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Diffusion and Predominance of Employment Rules |
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61 | (25) |
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61 | (1) |
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Task Allocation Rules as Partial `Evolutionarily Stable Strategies' |
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62 | (5) |
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Predominance of Individual Transaction Rules |
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67 | (5) |
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68 | (2) |
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First-mover Difficulties for Innovators |
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70 | (1) |
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Incompatibilities between the Rules |
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71 | (1) |
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The Need for Inter-firm Institutions |
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72 | (11) |
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Improving the Robustness of Transaction Rules |
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72 | (2) |
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Power Balance and Policing Members' Actions |
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74 | (2) |
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Greater Flexibility of Application |
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76 | (4) |
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Renegotiation of Transaction Rules |
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80 | (3) |
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Conclusion: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Labour Institutions |
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83 | (3) |
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Classification Rules and the Consolidation of Employment Systems |
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86 | (31) |
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86 | (1) |
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A Theory of Job Classification |
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87 | (5) |
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87 | (2) |
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`Atomistic' and `Holistic' Views of Job Classification |
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89 | (2) |
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Incompleteness of Job Descriptions |
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91 | (1) |
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Some Lessons from Occupational Classifications used in Earnings Statistics |
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92 | (5) |
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Labour Market Conventions and Job Classifications |
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97 | (6) |
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Multi-employer Job Classification Agreements |
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97 | (4) |
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Familiarity and Convention |
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101 | (2) |
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Some Comparative Evidence on Classifications and their Diffusion |
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103 | (4) |
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Reinterpreting the ILO Evidence |
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104 | (1) |
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Coverage of Classification Systems |
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105 | (2) |
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The Role of Institutions in Diffusing Classification Rules |
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107 | (2) |
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Employment Systems: Integrating Transaction Rules and Inter-firm Institutions |
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109 | (8) |
| Part II Evidence and Personnel Management Implications |
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Societal Diversity of Employment Systems: Comparative Evidence |
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117 | (31) |
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Some Evidence of Inter-country Differences in Employment Systems |
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117 | (2) |
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Production Versus Training Approach: Key Indicators |
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119 | (9) |
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119 | (2) |
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Skill Transferability and Occupational Markets |
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121 | (1) |
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Internal Promotion and Internal Labour Markets |
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122 | (1) |
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Treatment of Skills in Job and Pay Classifications |
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123 | (1) |
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Wage Contours and Occupational and Internal Labour Markets |
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124 | (4) |
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Task-oriented versus Function-oriented Approach: Key Indicators |
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128 | (5) |
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128 | (2) |
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130 | (1) |
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Functional Specialization of Work Roles |
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130 | (1) |
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Hierarchical Segmentation |
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131 | (1) |
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Patterns of Functional Flexibility |
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132 | (1) |
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Diffusion of Main Employment Systems |
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133 | (6) |
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133 | (4) |
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137 | (2) |
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139 | (9) |
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148 | (29) |
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148 | (2) |
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The Inherent Difficulties of Performance Measurement |
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150 | (3) |
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Objective/Non-judgemental Criteria |
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150 | (1) |
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151 | (2) |
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Mutual Distrust and Performance Management |
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153 | (1) |
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Some Conventionally Used Performance Criteria |
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154 | (2) |
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How the Contractual Constraints Shape Performance Criteria |
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156 | (8) |
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The Enforceability Constraint |
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157 | (3) |
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The Efficiency Constraint |
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160 | (4) |
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Moral Hazard, Transaction Rules and Performance Criteria |
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164 | (5) |
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Employer Protections against Moral Hazard by Employees |
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164 | (2) |
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Employee Protections against Employer Opportunism |
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166 | (3) |
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Conclusion: Societal Influences on Performance Criteria |
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169 | (2) |
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Appendix 1 Some Examples of Criteria Used in Performance Appraisal |
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171 | (2) |
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Appendix 2 Transaction Rules and Performance Standards |
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173 | (4) |
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177 | (36) |
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A Theory of Pay and Classifications |
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177 | (7) |
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The Price of Labour is a Rule not a Number |
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178 | (4) |
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Price and Job Classifications |
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182 | (2) |
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Price as a Rule and `Rate for the Job' |
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184 | (6) |
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Rate for the Job and Opportunism |
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184 | (3) |
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Dealing with Contingencies: Why Pay Schedules are so Complex |
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187 | (1) |
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Dealing with Exceptions to `Rate for the Job': the Example of Trainee Pay |
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188 | (2) |
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Rate-for-the-Job Classification and Pay for Performance |
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190 | (8) |
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Moral Hazard and Performance Pay |
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190 | (3) |
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Job Classification and Rewarding Performance at the Margin |
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193 | (5) |
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Hierarchical versus Occupational Classifications and Pay Structures |
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198 | (11) |
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Hierarchical and Occupational Pay Structures |
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199 | (4) |
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Pay Continuity Between the Blue--and White-Collar Hierarchies |
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203 | (3) |
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Pay for Organizational versus Occupational Skills |
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206 | (1) |
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Company Employment Practices and Pay Systems |
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206 | (3) |
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209 | (4) |
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Skills and Labour Market Structure |
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213 | (34) |
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213 | (1) |
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Effects of the Production and Training Approaches on Labour Market Structure |
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214 | (5) |
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Approaches to Enforceability and Functional Flexibility |
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219 | (2) |
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Institutionalization of Transaction rules by OLMs and ILMs |
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221 | (10) |
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Institutional Foundations of Occupational Markets |
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222 | (1) |
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The of Role of Institutions When Employers Share Training Costs |
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223 | (5) |
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ILMs and their Institutional Supports |
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228 | (3) |
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Monopsony and Secondary Labour Markets |
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231 | (2) |
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Employment and Self-employment |
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233 | (9) |
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Some Quantitative Evidence on Alternatives to the Employment Relationship |
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233 | (3) |
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Employment Systems and Market-mediated Employment |
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236 | (2) |
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Movements between Employment Forms |
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238 | (4) |
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242 | (5) |
| Part III Conclusions |
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Employment Systems and the Theory of the Firm: Societal Diversity |
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247 | (27) |
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247 | (2) |
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Transaction Costs, Opportunism and Knowledge |
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249 | (3) |
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250 | (2) |
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Flexibility, Productivity and Skills |
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252 | (2) |
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The Quality of Trust and Cooperation within the Firm |
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254 | (3) |
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The Role of Inter-firm Institutions |
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257 | (12) |
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The Benefits of Inter-firm Institutions |
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257 | (2) |
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Consequences of Institutional Weakness |
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259 | (3) |
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Function and Form of Labour Institutions |
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262 | (4) |
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Models of Corporate Governance |
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266 | (3) |
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Societal Diversity of Employment Systems |
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269 | (5) |
| References |
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274 | (17) |
| Index |
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291 | |